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Hannah Arendt’s well-known examinations of the problem of evil are not contradictory
and they are central to her corpus. Evil can be banal in some cases (Adolf Eichmann)
and radical (the phenomenon of totalitarianism) in others. But behind all expressions
of evil, in Arendt’s formulations, is the imperative that it be confronted by thinking
subjects and thoroughly historicized. This led her away from a view of evil as radical
to one of evil as banal. Arendt’s ruminations on evil are illuminated, in part, by
concerns that she shared with her fellow New York intellectuals about the withering
effects of mass culture upon individual volition and understanding. In confronting the
challenges of evil, Arendt functioned as a “moral historian,” suggesting proﬁtable ways
that historians might look at history from a moral perspective. Indeed, her work may
be viewed as anticipating a “moral turn” currently afoot in the historical profession.

Soon after her book Eichmann in Jerusalem was published in 1963, Hannah
Arendt faced a hornet’s nest of controversy for her strong moral judgments
and engagement with the problem of evil. Arendt had certainly made some
controversial moral judgments. First, she condemned the Judenräte, the Jewish
councils formed during the Holocaust that, in her opinion, were guilty of
collaboration with the Nazis. Second, she found Adolf Eichmann, who helped
to organize the logistics of the Holocaust, to have been a mundane bureaucrat
whose evil was located in his thoughtlessness, rather than in any demonic intent.
With regard to Eichmann she coined the phrase “the banality of evil,” a concept

∗

This essay has been greatly improved by the comments of Charles Capper and the
anonymous readers for MIH. I thank James Hoopes, Nelson Lichtenstein, and Ann
Schoﬁeld for always helping with early and late drafts. Many scholars have either read
this piece or material for the project on philosophy and morality of which it is a part.
Thank you to: Paul S. Boyer, Ronald Bush, Howard Brick, Kirsten Fermaglich, Raymond
Haberski, Melody Herr, Larry Inchausti, Bruce Kuklick, Steven Marx, Kevin Mattson,
Andrew Morris, Lewis Perry, Jennifer Ratner-Rosenhagen, Joan Rubin, Stephen Tootle,
and Martin Woessner.

463

464 george cotkin

that seemed far removed from the monumental horrors of the Nazi era that she
had earlier in The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951) described as a “radical evil.”1
“I know that the souls of our six million martyrs [Jewish Holocaust victims]
whom you desecrated,” wrote J. Baron to Arendt, “will swarm about you day
and night; they will give you no rest.”2 In the New York Times review that
had instigated Baron’s letter, Judge Michael A. Musmanno damned Arendt for
presenting Eichmann in a favorable light and for making Jewish leaders into
perpetrators rather than victims of the Holocaust.3 Even old friends turned on her.
Norman Podhoretz, editor of the inﬂuential journal Commentary, condemned
her “manipulation of the evidence” and “perversity of brilliance.”4
Hannah Arendt was controversial, to be sure, as an analyst of totalitarianism
and in her judgments about Eichmann. Sometimes she was shoddy as a historian;
she could be overbearing as a moral philosopher. Unlike the historian, Arendt
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was not sufﬁciently careful to moderate her interpretative needs to the resistances
of the facts. She sometimes practiced her historical analysis at a meta-level,
uncomfortable with nuances that undermined her generalizations. At her best,
however, she labored to bring her metaphysical and moral speculations down
to earth. And she was engaged in two undertakings of great importance. First,
her work suggests that historians and philosophers need not operate at crosspurposes. Second, she beckons historians to join her in analyses of evil.
Historians are of course most comfortable on the terra ﬁrma of established
facts, no matter how much postmodernists may problematize that term. In
addition to their trusty empiricism, historians are generally hesitant to render
strong judgments, lest they be accused of moralizing, or of allowing present
ideals to be applied, perhaps anachronistically, to the past, with its different
cultural contexts. Yet the historian and the moral philosopher are both exemplary
storytellers. Historical narratives are adept at illuminating moral challenges.
Historians highlight possible beginnings and endings, roads taken and rejected,
contexts near and far. Moreover, the manner in which historians craft a narrative
and organize materials is full of implicit moral judgments. Even a traditionalist
historian such as Richard J. Evans recognizes that historians, while they graze
among the facts, also make moral judgments, albeit without heavy-handed
“expressions of moral outrage.”5 Moral philosophy, in turn, although sometimes
burdened by its admonitions and abstractions, works best when, like history, it
allows for interpretation of concrete facts with attention to a variety of frameworks
for understanding.6
But philosophers have been more willing than historians to grapple with the
signiﬁcant problem of evil, perhaps the central problem in moral philosophy.
Before 9/11 brought the vocabulary of evil back into our conversation, American
studies scholar Andrew Delbanco bemoaned how Americans had lost their sense
of Satan and evil.7 Arendt, as a moral philosopher and historian, devoted twenty
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years to thinking about evil. Arendt’s focus on evil connected her to the postSecond World War New York intellectual milieu, although philosophers fail to
make this connection. More signiﬁcantly, I ﬁnd her famous shift, from thinking
about evil as radical to thinking about it as banal, to be a movement more com
plementary than contradictory. While evil is sometimes banal in its public face
and intent, it cannot be divorced from thinking and acting subjects.8 Evil can be
demonic or radical, as in Hitler or Stalin, but it still must be anchored in history.9
With conﬁdent and complex steps, Arendt walked into the subject of evil. It
was, in the aftermath of the Holocaust and the emergence of totalitarianism, the
burden of her time. In so doing, Arendt bequeathed a legacy for historians through
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her willingness to engage with the thick reality of evil, and by her developing
conceptualizations about it. She recognized the demonic and metaphysical
qualities of evil, which threatened to place it outside the historical vision. But she
also sought to render evil as something concrete and as something superﬂuous
(as excess and as unnecessary). Evil must be surveyed as it has existed in the
past so that it can be understood today. In sum, as Israeli philosopher Adi Ophir
emphasizes, evil—as cruelty or humiliation—is anchored in social realities and
capable of being combated. It is as much stuff for historians and philosophers as
it is for preachers and politicians.10

∗∗∗
Arendt, in her engagement with totalitarianism and the Holocaust, faced
difﬁculties in navigating the still unsettled waters and emerging meaning
around the event. In many ways, the Holocaust resisted any easy narration of
triumphalism or defeatism. While the total destruction of European Jewry had
been stalled, it had come horribly close to achieving Hitler’s totalitarian dream
of exceeding the limits of possibility. A narrative of the Allied victory of reason,
democracy, and morality victorious over Axis irrationality, dictatorship, and
amorality was available after the war, but it missed much of the complexities of
modernity, mass politics, and psychology that occupied Arendt’s ﬁeld of vision.
Also, she composed Origins, one of the more ambitious and probing works of
the recent horror, before much serious scholarly work had been done on the
Holocaust. She did proﬁt from some earlier work but she was, largely, setting out
in a host of new and controversial directions.11
Adding to the problems faced by Arendt in Origins, and even more in
Eichmann, was her ambiguous status as both outsider and insider in relation
to the Holocaust and its emerging communities of survivors. As her fellow exile
Theodor Adorno put it, all exiles are, “without exception, mutilated.”12 This sense
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of mutilation was heightened depending upon one’s own relationship with the
Holocaust. Arendt was not, in a strict sense, a survivor, having escaped in 1933 to
France, before coming to the United States in 1941. Fellow exile and historian Raul
Hilberg noted the reality of a “rank order” among Holocaust victims. Survivors,
those singed by the ﬁre of the horrors, spoke with authenticity and power; those
who escaped before the juggernaut had fully rolled were semi-privileged but
nonetheless distanced observers.13 Arendt got out just in time to avoid the worst,
but she lived in the shadow of that trauma, and it shaped her. Yet she was,
by dint of her German birth and brushes with German authorities, an insider.
More importantly, Arendt was a witness. She had lived through this event of
monumental proportions to such a degree that, as philosopher Margaret Canovan
and others note, she made her reﬂections about the rise of totalitarianism and its
challenge to philosophy, morality, and democracy the key themes of her immense
body of work.14
Born into comfortable circumstances in 1906, Arendt left Germany as a
mature woman, already formed by her philosophical education with Martin
Heidegger and Karl Jaspers, as well as by her activities in the anti-Nazi movement.
The Reichstag Fire of 1933 burned itself in Arendt’s memory as a moment of
“immediate shock,” the point at which her sense of well-being as a German of
Jewish ancestry was shattered.15 At one point soon after, she was arrested in Berlin
for involvement in anti-Nazi actions (she had been compiling excerpts of Nazi
anti-Semitic utterances). She was released from jail after the fatherly intercession
of a police ofﬁcer. Later, while in exile in Paris, she did relief work for Jewish
refugees before escaping from the advancing armies of the Third Reich to safe
haven in the United States. Arendt brought with her the conviction that emotion
and ideology polluted reason, along with a willingness to range far and wide in
her attempts to uncover the causes for the calamity then transpiring.16
Arendt settled in New York City, along with her husband Heinrich Blücher,
and she soon assumed a leading position among the Jewish intellectuals huddled
around publications such as Partisan Review and Commentary.17 Arendt and
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her new comrades shared anti-Stalinist politics, support for most United States
actions in the Cold War, wariness (to put it mildly) of mass culture, and a
conviction of the value of a tragic sensibility. Her friend, writer Alfred Kazin,
heralded Arendt’s “intellectual courage before the moral terror the war had
willed to us.”18 She pushed her new companions to think more philosophically
by pointing some of them towards Heidegger’s work and by being a citadel for
them of the best in European culture.
Arendt and the New York intellectuals wanted to deal with evil in a realistic
manner. A willingness to think about evil and the tragic sense of life had been
gaining vigor at least since the early 1920s in the conversation of intellectuals. In
part this was a response to the horrors of the First World War and the challenges
of modernity. Theologian Reinhold Niebuhr had long intoned the centrality of
sin and evil in human existence, while editorialist Walter Lippmann stressed
how “the acids of modernity” had contributed to a tragic modern malaise.19
After the Second World War, in the halls of Columbia University, according to
political scientist Ira Katznelson, a tragic sensibility informed the work of political
scientists and historians, ranging from David Truman to Richard Hofstadter.20
Many non-academic intellectuals, forged in the crucible of disappointed
dreams of Marxian revolution and working-class redemption, found in a tragic
sensibility, tinged with evil, a logical antidote to the excesses of earlier utopian
dreams. When Dwight Macdonald contemplated the horror of extermination
camps and the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and when theologian
Will Herberg wondered about the fate of Jews in the modern world following the
Holocaust, both of them acknowledged the power of a tragic perspective; they
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had faced evil in their time.21 New York intellectuals joined with Arendt, despite
the fact that most of them were resolutely secular, to engage with evil, as a concept
and a reality, thus entering into that “frontier of metaphysics or mysticism” that
T. S. Eliot had warned against following the First World War.22 While the New
Yorkers’ embrace of tragedy and evil often fed into the power and presumptions
of American foreign policy, it could also question deeply held ideals of progress
and conﬁdence. Evil in the chastened hands of many former Marxist radicals also
posited human limitation and the propensity to act in both an irrational and a
nefarious manner.23
Arendt, then, worked within a coterie and context that supported her own
concern with evil. Her view in 1950 was that since the Holocaust was an “altogether
unprecedented phenomenon,” a unique evil, masked by an “unreality which
surrounds the hellish experiment,” the traditional concepts and methods of social
science would be stymied.24 Evil must be examined. Arendt was determined to
demonstrate how the Nazis had, through ideological fanaticism and bureaucratic
rationales, reduced Jews to a species of non-being, making it all the easier for
them to be eliminated. This action, this willingness to think that anything was
possible and that people could be rendered superﬂuous, would form the core of
her analysis of the nature of totalitarian, and especially Nazi, evil.
Arendt published both her books when the Holocaust was relatively peripheral
to the lives and minds of Americans. Even her fellow New York intellectuals, while
increasingly intrigued by Judaism and drawn towards the tragic, did not focus on
the event.25 It was, as Michel Foucault and Ian Hacking would put it, an object that
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had not yet come into being or been constituted.26 Jewish Americans, especially
survivors or those related to survivors, experienced the Holocaust as trauma,
often met by repression, silence, or engagement.27 Only in the early 1960s, for a
host of reasons, did the Holocaust enter fully into the American conscience.28
Historian Peter Novick emphasizes that the trauma of the Holocaust was cast
aside and transformed into a narrative that foreshadowed and defended the
state of Israel.29 However, Arendt was hardly an enthusiastic supporter of Israeli
ethnocentrism and military policies, and her writing resists appropriation into
any Zionist morality tale. She was after bigger, more ambitious game—to grab
hold of a synoptic account of the horror that she had witnessed in full from the
safe shores of America.30
Arendt disdained metaphysical explanations even as she was placing evil
and morality centrally in her analysis. While she failed to banish metaphysics
sufﬁciently from her initial conception of evil, she shifted as already noted, away
from evil as something radical in the 1940s and 1950s to evil as produced in
an often banal manner in the early 1960s. Most controversially, as we will see,
Arendt also addressed the politically and morally charged question of the role
and responsibility of Jews in their own demise in Eichmann in Jerusalem.
Milton Himmelfarb, witty editor of Commentary magazine, once famously
stated, “No Hitler, No Holocaust.”31 Arendt did not share his opinion. Indeed, in
Arendt’s two works on the Holocaust, Hitler is at best a peripheral ﬁgure. In this
approach, Arendt was hewing the line then favored by institutional historians and
social-science methodology. The reasons for this conscious omission relate to the
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imperatives of Arendt’s narrative and moral project. For Arendt, the depiction
of totalitarianism and the Holocaust depended on analysis of large ideas and
events: romanticism, imperialism, and anti-Semitism. And once totalitarianism
had risen to power, it then demanded institutional analysis in order to understand
how it functioned and maintained power through terror. Thus Arendt tried to
combine large ideas with attention to details and “concrete things,” both in
Origins and in Eichmann.32 Focusing on Hitler, she feared, would open up the
ﬂoodgates of the demonic. He might be viewed, over time, as the aesthete of evil
and thereby gain a cultish following.
Others, however, pushed to recognize Hitler’s central role in the making of
history. Before her book on totalitarianism appeared in 1951, philosopher and New
York intellectual Sidney Hook had written inﬂuentially about how individuals’
roles in history should never be ignored, without slighting the importance of
historical context. Hook responded to old issues of agency and determinism in
Marxian theory.33 Arendt was unconcerned with this debate, but she composed
her work at a moment when fascination with Hitler threatened to swamp
attention to historical forces and contingency. British historian Hugh Trevor
Roper’s The Last Days of Hitler (1947) had been a sensationalistic bestseller, and
soon after Arendt’s work had been published, Alan Bullock’s Hitler: A Study
in Tyranny added to the fascination with Hitler.34 Moreover, to place Hitler
center stage would have forced Arendt to confront the problem of evil within
a larger-than-life human being. She preferred, in Origins, to deal with evil as a
manifestation of forces associated with modernity and corrosive of tradition.35
When she ﬁnally did peer into the mind of a criminal, as in her analysis of Adolf
Eichmann, she reduced evil to a function of his thoughtlessness and presence
within an institutional structure of authority.
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∗∗∗
Arendt began in the mid-1940s to think long and hard about the problem
of evil, and it would be central to her major work of 1951, The Origins
of Totalitarianism. She published the book at the right historical moment
of mounting Cold War tensions and ideological skirmishing. For Arendt
totalitarianism represented a radical, and evil, break from previous political and
social systems, in its administration, ultimate illogic, and terror. In a sense,
totalitarianism was partly an outgrowth of modernization, especially in its
emphasis on technologies of destruction, ideology of scientiﬁc racism, and ability
to undermine traditional notions of moral responsibility.36 Totalitarianism also
emerged from other factors: the rise of anti-Semitism, the stateless position of
Jews, the decline of the nation state, the resurrection of racial thinking and the
development of the modern masses, imperialism, and nationalism. Only after
close to four hundred pages on these events did she get to the moral heart of her
evil subject—how totalitarian regimes seek to consign to “holes of oblivion” its
victims’ bodies and memories.
Arendt was wary of ﬁrsthand testimony about the Holocaust because its
veracity had not been strained through the sieve of time and trauma.37 At
those times when she does refer to accounts of the concentration camps,
it is for background, rather than for thick description or emotionally
wrenching testimony.38 While there is some truth that Arendt’s presentation
is unsentimental, it is also awash in powerful metaphors and hyperbole. Notions
such as “holes of oblivion” or the “fabrication of corpses” serve as a way for Arendt
to make clear the radical originality of the Holocaust and totalitarianism. But
she remained wary of using the testimony of those who suffered most closely the
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outrage of totalitarianism. She found in survivor testimony a certain uniformity
that suggested to her a scripted rather than a thoughtful engagement with the
experience of evil.39 There is not a single, if I am not mistaken, eyewitness account
that could be described as emotionally compelling in Origins.
When Arendt composed Origins she lacked access to the mountain of survivor
and perpetrator testimonies available today and to the subsequent ﬂood of sec
ondary accounts. Yet, as her footnotes clearly indicate, she had sufﬁcient examples
of survivor testimony near to hand. For instance, she had the example and
writings of David Rousset. A fellow philosopher who had before the war taught
in a French lycée, Rousset found himself deposited in a series of concentration
camps for resistance-related activities. Arendt was familiar with his account, and
he helped her to understand the chaos and illogic of a concentration camp world
where “everything is possible.” His account is an intimate memory of horrors
experienced, described, and comprehended. Unlike Arendt, Rousset pulls no
punches in representing this “world like a dead planet laden with corpses” (168).
Evil abounds in the concentration camp. He describes how the
Sonderkommando (special units of Jews charged with pushing victims into and
then taking them out of the gas chamber) upon opening the gas chamber doors
confront a “wall of corpses, inextricably intertwined.” In another passage, he
relates how inmates with “a hideous hunger in their bellies,” in a conﬁned space,
“will massacre each other for a half an ounce of bread, for a bit of elbow room”
(60–61). In this truly “monstrous” world, guards are “posted over the dead” with
orders to kill those [inmates] who eat the scrawny, fetid ﬂesh of the cadavers” (40).
Rousset was the philosopher returned from hell; he rejects the narrative and
conceptual constraints favored by Arendt. In her political philosophy, Arendt
always celebrated pluralism (“Plurality is the law of the earth”), the variety of
viewpoints engaging one another in a cosmopolitan world of stirring debate and
openness.40 But Arendt never sufﬁciently confronted in her work the bodies and
voices of the victims except in her abstract, analytical manner. If she had, then
perhaps she might have been able to join her analysis with a rendering of the world
of the concentration camp made ﬂesh. To do this is, as Elaine Scarry points out, to
hear the screams of the survivors (even if those screams cannot have “referential”
content) and, as Susan Sontag came to realize, to put images of hell into a context.41
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Arendt recognized totalitarian evil as something radically new in history, a
sustained and manic attack against humanity. Borrowing a phrase from Rousset,
Arendt stated that totalitarian regimes believed that “everything is possible,” and
they aligned themselves with the deterministic forces of History and Nature.42
The danger of such identiﬁcations, or of revolutionary virtue without limitations,
became a key theme of her On Revolution (1963). As she put it, “The evil of Robe
spierre’s virtue was that it did not accept any limitations.”43 Fanatical marches of
personal, philosophical, and/or natural necessity made human beings superﬂu
ous, as it had snuffed out Jews. Its insane logic applied to the Nazis themselves,
hence the Götterdämmerung central to their apocalyptic vision. Erasure of the Jews
began with minor, often absurd, sanctions designed to erode their legal and polit
ical rights as individuals, as well as their identities as Germans.44 Once stripped
of their rights and identity, without any connection to the nation or polity, the
superﬂuous person is tossed easily into the concentration camp, that “terrible
abyss that separates the world of the living from that of the living dead” (CR 441).
Totalitarian evil sought to erase all traces of its victims.45 In the whirlwind of
Nazi fanaticism and ideology, Jews were stripped of connection to the familiar
objects of everyday life, beginning with job, wealth, political rights, and even living
place. Ultimately, their few connecting threads to the past—photographs, lockets,
and rings—are ripped from them upon entry into the concentration camp.
Arendt compellingly stated, “Like the new type of murderer who kills his victims
for no special purpose of self-interest, we may not be aware that anybody has been
murdered at all if, for all practical purposes, he did not exist before” (CR 434).
Conditions in the camps, the grinding insanity and cruelty—the “excremental
assault,” as Terrence Des Pres phrased it—corrodes the essence of being as an
individual tied to a group or tradition; all that the individual can think about is
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survival.46 Like the powers in Orwell’s chilling Nineteen Eighty Four, totalitarians
seek to control the future, in part, by securing the past. The totalitarian need
to rewrite history, especially as evidenced by the Soviet desire for confession on
the part of its victims, is central for Arendt. Through confession, even if the
individual is innocent in “reality,” he or she accepts the call of the Party “to play
the role of the criminal,” thus becoming in effect “objectively . . . the enemy of
the Party” and conﬁrming the original charges lodged against him (CR 473).
In this totalitarian nightmare the very foundations of moral judgment and
historical truth are destroyed. In part, Arendt is aware that morality is in short
supply in the concentration camps, run according to a monumental illogic and
feeding upon chaos as a new rule of order. Her concern is with the morality of
the perpetrators, in contrast to the morality of its victims. Here Arendt proves
more insightful about the larger logic and less willing to judge the inmates
than her fellow survivor and contemporary, Bruno Bettelheim.47 As a resolute
secularist, Arendt maintains that the notion of a God-given, biblical morality has
been banished by the forces of modernity and the horrors recently unleashed.
Leibniz had attempted to secure God’s place in a world of terrible earthquakes,
for example, by proclaiming that, ultimately, all is right with the world, that this is
the best of all possible worlds. For Arendt, in her presentation of the totalitarian
world as illogical, irrational, and bloodthirsty, even the Ten Commandments
were inadequate in the face of the horror. No longer could the myths of JudeoChristianity, in her view, secure authority. Beyond the decimation of religious
ideals, Arendt argued that totalitarianism had sent “three thousand years of
Western Civilization” “toppling down over our heads.” In its radical insanity, its
fantastical view of the world, and its rejection of rationality and of all “implied
beliefs, traditions, standards of judgment,” the totalitarian machine, in effect,
had ended the traditional conversation of philosophy and morality (CR 434).
Arendt no doubt agreed with survivor Primo Levi’s famous observation, “there
is Auschwitz, so there cannot be God.”48
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∗∗∗
“[T]he problem of evil,” wrote Arendt in the Partisan Review in 1945, “will be
the fundamental question of postwar intellectual life in Europe.” Arendt initially
engaged this problem in a lengthy review of Denis de Rougemont’s The Devil’s
Snare (1944). She criticized his theological speculations, condemning him for
a Gnosticism that posited “an eternal ﬁght between God and the Devil” and
for permitting undue metaphysical speculation to distance him from reality.49
However, Arendt agreed with much in Rougement. He contended that Hitler
was not the demonic principle incarnate, but rather someone wearing a “satanic
insignia,” not apart from humanity. Hitler, in essence, personiﬁed the potential
evil in all of us. Rougemont, with Niebuhr and Arendt, contended that evil resides
within each of us, ready to emerge “under the cover of wretchedness or fatigue
or some temporary disequilibrium,” such as an economic depression.50
Rougemont anticipated the path that Arendt traveled over the next twenty
years in her complex and productive confrontation with evil. To be sure, she
remained consistent in refusing to discuss Hitler out of a fear of making him into
an icon of evil. Arendt was at her best in trying to understand how evil appeared
under particular conditions, rather than as some abstraction or metaphysical
presence.51
In the mid-1940s Arendt could not shake her shivering sense that the Nazi
moment had deﬁed tried and true methods of comprehension. The problem
for Arendt was to frame the challenge of evil without falling into mysticism or
metaphysics, or making evil into something resembling an aesthetic choice. She
wrote her philosophical mentor Karl Jaspers that Nazi inhumanity had opened
up an “abyss” in understanding, “and I don’t know how we will ever get out of it.”
Indeed, Arendt’s dilemma went beyond simple problems of morality. If the Nazis
were guilty of crimes pervasively perverse against people who were conspicuously
innocent, then could our traditional moral and legal categories enter into play?
The guilt of the Nazis “explodes the limits of the law; and that is precisely what
constitutes their monstrousness.”52
Jaspers rejected Arendt’s initial tendency to view evil as metaphysical, perhaps
beyond comprehension. Instead, he posited that evil had a “prosaic triviality”
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rather than any taint of “satanic greatness.”53 He worried that any “hint of myth
and legend” would feed into a sort of pagan idolatry of Nazi evil. While Arendt
agreed with him on this point, in the mid-1940s, she was unprepared to adopt
it—the horrendous memory of Nazi atrocities against humanity still burned too
menacingly. She held onto the perhaps common-sense view of differentiating
between a murderer who kills out of passion or self-interest and the Nazi machine
of destruction which erected “factories to produce corpses” out of a utopian and
illogical fanaticism designed to “eradicate the concept of the human being.”54
This, rather than any sense of “prosaic triviality,” was what constituted evil in
its full ﬂowering and what made it radical. But she did not recognize that both
notions of evil need not cancel one another out.
Although she employed the term “evil” sparingly in The Origins of
Totalitarianism, its presence informed nearly every page of the text, and it came
already wrapped up in a long philosophical tradition. Many have pondered how
Arendt’s invocation of the terms “radical” and “absolute” evil are connected to
Kant’s classic discussion.55 Kant did set up the categories and language for most
subsequent discussions of the problem of evil. In brief, Kant posits that evil is not
inherent in human nature; he rejects any notion of original sin. Evil arises when
the individual will chooses an option; without freedom, there is no choice. Evil
comes when the individual chooses without obedience to moral law. For Kant,
the key is the intention of the actor, the desire of the individual to act, or not
to act, in accord with practical reason. Hence evil is the weakness of our selﬁsh
nature, of our desire to act as if we were God, which undermines our sense of
limits and altruism.56 Radical evil, in Kantian terms, “corrupts the ground of all
maxims,” it represents something wickedly new, a “perversity of the heart.”57
But Arendt’s use of the term “radical evil” differs from Kant’s, as philosopher
Richard J. Bernstein explains. For Kant, radical evil constitutes man’s break from
the moral law; there is no sense in Kant of man choosing with full knowledge
to become demonic or evil.58 Arendt goes well beyond Kant’s formulation, in
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part, because after Auschwitz she had encountered actions that would have been
incomprehensible to Kant’s Enlightenment sensibility. Moreover, Arendt’s view
of radical evil began where Kant’s notion left off. For Kant, evil depended upon
freedom, upon contingency and choice. Totalitarianism had demolished them,
along with spontaneity. In this world, evil had assumed a new face.
In her darkest moments, reﬂecting upon the production of totalitarianism
as “the burden of our time,” Arendt fell into her own hole of interpretative
“oblivion.”59 Accept for the sake of argument her conclusion that totalitarian
evil was radical—a form of terror previously unknown and unimagined in
human history. The evil of the crusades, cruciﬁxions, slavery, pogroms—the
list is endless—pales in the face of modern totalitarian evils, as recounted by
Arendt. At least with past evils, as she understood them, there was logic and
self-interest at the core of the crimes. Totalitarian evil, while it upheld an ideal
of transformation, was essentially aimless, an end in and of itself. Totalitarian
evil also proved to be ineffable as a result. It was beyond the law, beyond
reason, beyond punishment since the law and punishment depended upon
moral assumptions that totalitarianism virtually transcended. Totalitarianism’s
“perverted will” (457–9) had transported it “beyond good and evil,” in the least
sympathetic reading imaginable of Nietzsche’s terms.
Thus Arendt had painted herself into a narrow corner. If the crimes of
totalitarianism were as original and immense as she averred, then could they be
anything other than demonic? She never hesitated to describe them throughout
Origins and articles as “monstrous”—as well they were. But her use the term
“demonic” might place them outside the realm of explanation and the march
of worldly events. The demonic can resist laws of nature or the wills of men.
Even strong structures of representative democracy and public debate, it seemed,
were futile against this demonic entity. Such was clearly not Arendt’s intent.
For example, she purposely ignored any substantial focus on the leaders of
totalitarianism because to pay attention to them would have forced her into the
realm of the demonic, of the individual infused with evil. She also refused to
discuss at any length Hitler and Stalin to avoid romanticizing them or elevating
them into heroes of the demonic. But they can be seen in demonic proportions
without forcing them into an interpretative abyss. For these leaders were also part
and parcel of a political, social, and cultural world that nurtured them in part, and
that they also sought to destroy or reconﬁgure. Arendt was onto something when
she remarked about the mysterious nature of evil as something not “humanly
understandable.” Everything need not be understandable on such terms, but it
can be interpreted in more or less convincing fashion. Arendt’s frustrations grew
59
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to the point where, just after publication of The Origins of Totalitarianism, she
proclaimed, “What radical evil is I don’t know.”60

∗∗∗
The trial of Adolf Eichmann in 1961 for the murder of millions of Jews afforded
Arendt excellent opportunity to revisit unresolved issues about evil. In June 1960
Arendt wrote her friend, writer Mary McCarthy, that she was “half toying” with
getting a commission to cover the trial.61 Much to her delight, The New Yorker
magazine sent her as its representative. Arendt knew the stakes in the Eichmann
trial were high. “The Eichmann trial has us all stirred up,” she wrote to Jaspers,
“It will, in its totality, become a major symbol of the life of the mind today.”62
Arendt’s report transformed Eichmann into a “major symbol” for a new
form of evil—”the banality of evil,” which became the controversial subtitle of
her volume, Eichmann in Jerusalem. As noted earlier, the book was extremely
controversial for a number of reasons. First, her coverage of the trial helped
to usher in an era of Holocaust awareness.63 Second, many readers felt that
Arendt had belittled Eichmann’s responsibility as a leading Nazi war criminal
and that her “banality of evil” thesis downplayed the monstrous nature of the
evil that had rained down upon the Jews. Third, Arendt dismissed the testimony
of survivors as unreliable and formulaic. Finally, building upon the recently
published research by Raul Hilberg in his The Destruction of the European Jews
(1961), Arendt devoted a few pages to unfavorably presenting Jewish councils as
cooperative with the Nazis in the elimination of the Jews.
Arent’s Eichmann was a relatively innocuous fellow, a dedicated bureaucrat,
and a man without any independence of mind. She now embraced Jaspers’s
earlier claim that evil was “prosaic” and “banal.” And, as we shall see, her new
conception of evil well ﬁtted what she understood as the numbing effects of
mass culture on the individual’s ability to think morally and complexly. If her
initial formulation of the problem of totalitarian evil was that it was demonic
and metaphysically elusive, the problem with the “banality of evil” thesis was that
evil was now ubiquitous. “Therein lies the horror and,” wrote Arendt, “at the
same time, the banality of evil.”64 Even if evil did not beat in the heart of every
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mindless bureaucrat, the upshot of Arendt’s analysis for many was that under
certain conditions individuals might well act no differently than had Eichmann.
The solution to this new face of evil seemed to be a call to think, to live an
active life of the mind so that when the individual confronted momentous, moral
choices, such a confrontation would include the moral reﬂection necessary to
deﬂect evil possibilities.
Arendt was in league with many New York and European intellectuals in using
mass culture as an analytic concept to explain evil. Although they often differed
about how capitalism and mass culture were related, and about the value of
Marxian analytic tools for understanding mass culture, all shared a genuine fear
that traditional culture and its institutions were being devalued and destroyed by
mass culture. Most famously, social theorist Erich Fromm—no less than Arendt
in Origins—argued that modern alienated masses had become easy prey for fascist
fantasies of power and possibility. While this fear of mass man was more muted in
postwar America, it was a common way of comprehending anti-intellectualism,
middle-brow culture’s presumed hegemony, and the allure of populist and fascist
movements among the masses.
Arendt, beginning in 1947, became close friends with David Riesman, a key
theorist of culture. The paradox of mass culture, as Riesman recognized, was that it
helped to destroy traditional bonds of community, thereby increasing individual
loneliness and alienation. At the same time, mass culture offered alternative
modes of belonging—through consumption, cooperation, ideology, and new
collective identities. No one examined mass culture more fully, and subtly, in
this period than Riesman. He had read and critiqued, and been inﬂuenced by his
reading in 1949 of, a draft manuscript of Arendt’s Origins. She, in turn, greatly
respected his work, The Lonely Crowd (1950). She agreed with his early hypothesis
that those individuals that were generally indignant about various issues were
fodder for the totalistic critique of fascism.65 Riesman brilliantly described a
change in the national character, from an inner-directed to an other-directed
personality. From a highly rigid and individualistic sense of self in the nineteenth
century, Americans had moved to a personality type that was dependent less
on family or internal certitude than on peer approval, mass advertising, and
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consumerism. Sinister readings could be placed upon this analysis, and Arendt
herself reacted to Riesman’s other-directed personality by seeing it as akin to
her own descriptions of the alienated masses in the period before the rise of the
Nazis.66
While Arendt and Riesman were concerned with mass culture and its effects,
other social theorists took their ideas, and joined them to the more hyper-critical
views of Frankfurt School theorists, to suggest that mass culture was a distinct
threat to American democracy and values. Thus fellow New York intellectuals
Richard Hofstadter and Daniel Bell, shocked by the anti-intellectualism of the
McCarthyites of the 1950s, saw lurking behind mass politics in the era signs
of proto-fascism or at least populist mediocrity and paranoia. In the language
of mass-culture critique, Hofstadter identiﬁed “rootlessness” as partly impelling
the “pseudo-conservatism” of the period. Moreover, “Mass communications have
aroused the mass man.” The implicit danger in this, as Hofstadter emphasized,
was not a quick descent into totalitarianism. But he did fret that the arrival of
mass man on the political and cultural stage in America would soon result in a
weakening of political leadership and in cultural mediocrity.67
Or, more tellingly, as in the case of Eichmann people followed orders because
they were incapable of thinking deeply or of examining moral perplexities.
They had, in this view, been trained to be nothing more than cogs in whatever
machine wanted them, for whatever purposes it wanted served. Borrowing from
the analysis of Theodor Adorno, Irving Howe described Donald Duck as “a
frustrated little monster who has something of the SS man in him and whom we,
also having something of the SS man in us, naturally ﬁnd quite charming.” In like
´
fashion and in anticipation of Arendt’s emphasis on the deadening role of cliches
in Eichmann’s mind, conservative social critic Ernst Van Den Haag found that
1950s American culture was being overrun by “familiar clichés” that undermined
thinking and diluted culture.68
Thus the equation of mass culture with other-directedness, of mass culture
with non-thinking, or thinking in clichés, was crucial for Arendt’s take on Adolf
Eichmann. It helped her to frame evil in a way that made it non-demonic and
intrinsically concrete; it also promised a solution for preventing the individual
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from plunging into evil actions. She presented Eichmann as a mere functionary,
a man without qualities. She found him a “normal” or “average” man (26).
However, when she had ﬁrst contemplated covering the trial, Arendt described
Eichmann as “the most intelligent of the lot” of Nazis.69 As the trial progressed
and she waded through the testimony, she concluded that Eichmann “was a
buffoon.” It was all she could do to control her laughter about his self-inﬂated
importance and cheerful wallowing in empty clichés, as she read the transcript
of his interrogation.70 Moreover, Arendt argued that Eichmann was no fanatic,
lacking even a hint of “insane hatred of Jews” or of ideological indoctrination (26,
36). He was, in effect, modern mass man. A careerist, comfortable in the womb
of the bureaucracy, Eichmann was like the individual that Arendt had described
in an early essay, “Organized Guilt and Universal Responsibility” (1945)—a man
concerned with his family, fearful of unemployment, willing to follow orders,
and capable of self-deception.71
Arendt explained how Eichmann compartmentalized his life, practiced selfdeception, and denied playing any role in the killing of Jews. In some ways, Arendt
presented Eichmann as the ironic apotheosis of the parvenu, the newcomer
to power, the person who wears the garments of the bourgeoisie in the
gaudiest fashion. Arendt—a self-proclaimed pariah against the weaknesses of the
“Spiessburger” (the affected, ceremonious bourgeoisie)—hated him and those of
his ilk.72 In addition, and in keeping with his bourgeois nature, Eichmann simply
followed orders, moving the trains with their human cargo along more efﬁciently.
He became a perfect example of a man doing his job, compartmentalized within
the bureaucracy, unwilling to peer too closely at reality. He understood the
trees but missed the forest. Critic Lionel Abel bellowed that Arendt’s Eichmann
appeared as nothing more than “an utterly replaceable instrument . . . a mere cog
in the machine” of the bureaucracy of murder.73
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Arendt recorded faithfully, rarely with any skepticism, Eichmann’s memory of
events and of his role in them. He stated that he had only bumped up accidentally
against the Holocaust. He had often visited Auschwitz, but its eighteen square
miles presumably allowed him to miss the places where the killing went on (89).
He had, however, seen on the Eastern Front mobile gas vans that were used to
execute Jews. Eichmann protested, however, that “I hardly looked. I could not.”
It “upset” him too much. He retreated back into his sense of duty and loyalty to
Hitler, and to the shufﬂing of papers (82).
Arendt as a moral historian judged Eichmann, even while she explained his
“innocence” as a thoughtless human being. She never doubted that he deserved
to be hanged. His actions were evil, even if his intentions were not. Hence the evil
of Eichmann was judged by its results rather than its motivations.74 Eichmann
was a banal man capable of doing great evil.
Although Eichmann at the trial managed to invoke a close-to-the text
description of Kant’s categorical imperative in his defense, claiming that he
was following the moral law (as laid down by the Führer), Eichmann missed the
essential point. For Arendt, and for Kant, the point was that the individual chose
only through the act of thinking, of judging possibilities. To act responsibly, one
had to think in terms larger than oneself or blind devotion to someone like Hitler,
who should never be viewed as synonymous with any moral order of things (22,
49).
Arendt greatly underestimated both Eichmann and his milieu. The notion
that such a mediocre fellow could rise so high into the upper echelon of the Nazi
killing machine strained credulity, as did her seconding of Eichmann’s contention
that he was ideologically naive or disinterested. “What is most striking in Miss
Arendt’s picture of Eichmann,” wrote Abel, “is her omission of any reference
to the man’s ideology.”75 Thanks to the painstaking research of David Cesarani
into Eichmann’s development and to Yaacov Lozowick into the bureaucracy of
the Nazi security police, a different picture of Eichmann emerges. Eichmann
jumped on the evil, ideological train of Nazism early and enthusiastically. He
rose quickly in the bureaucracy, despite his limited education, and he enjoyed
exercising his power and ﬁnding creative solutions to the essential problem of
how to kill millions of Jews as efﬁciently and cheaply as possible. As Cesarani
phrases it, Eichmann “was a knowing and willing accomplice to genocide.” He
made choices; he knew what he was doing. And, at the same time, he learned,
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evolved into a person willing and able to engage in genocide. There was nothing
banal about him, his institutional setting, intentions, or actions.76
Arendt also contradicted herself in her understanding of Eichmann as a banal
bureaucrat, someone blindly and loyally following orders. As Albert Breton and
Ronald Wintrobe have indicated, the Nazi murder machine was an immense and
decentralized bureaucracy. In order to rise to a central position, as had Eichmann,
one had to master a labyrinth of intrigue, to compete with other sections that were
always seeking to increase their own power and authority. In such a dog-eat-dog
reality, Eichmann’s emergence meant that he was both a brilliant player and a
dedicated one.77 Arendt’s own evidence should have led her in this direction. In
Origins she devoted many insightful pages to the bizarre Nazi bureaucracy, with
its multiplication of ofﬁces, competing powers, vague orders, power struggles,
and constant shifting of authority (399–420). She reiterated, albeit more brieﬂy,
this same understanding in Eichmann in Jerusalem, ﬁnding “ﬁerce competition”
in the bureaucracy. Clearly, her image of Eichmann as a rather normal, banal,
cliché-ridden individual failed to connect with his rather scandalous bureaucratic
success in the Nazi killing machine.
Why, then, did Arendt get so much wrong, and yet so much right, about
Eichmann and evil? While she made great strides in adopting the concept of the
banality of evil, to make it work in this particular situation she had to shoehorn
Eichmann into it. In fact, Eichmann may have been many things, but he was not
an ideologically impotent bureaucrat. But she got much right by bringing evil
down to a concrete level as it might appear in the ﬁgure of the cliché-ridden,
unthinking bureaucrat. Had Eichmann been capable of strenuous thought, of
confronting moral choices, then he, and others, might have been less prone to
follow orders, to fail to see and appreciate the necessary plurality of the world.
Thus the banality of evil that she evoked with Eichmann replaced the
ineffability and potentially demonic metaphysics that lurked behind her earlier
conception of radical evil. Evil had to be pulled down from the heights of the
demonic to the lows of modern bureaucracy and thoughtlessness. The problem
with different forms of demonism, as she had been lectured by Jaspers, was that
it threatened to become almost beyond comprehension. And, of equal threat,
the hugeness of demonism might be appealing, a way for some to transcend
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the mundane into a sense of greatness.78 Thus Arendt, in contrast, argued that
Eichmann was a mediocrity rather than a ﬁgure of any demonic proportions. He
could be condemned as a moral midget and a thoughtless clown, someone whose
“talents” had been nurtured within the bureaucratic machine. Arendt had nailed
an important reality of Eichmann and the phenomenon of “the banality of evil.”
Her new conception, even if it did have aspects of being a mere “catchword,”
as Gershom Scholem averred, did some heavy lifting for Arendt, and others
that followed in her wake.79 Gone was any hint of a Devil fallen from grace, or
of individuals seeking demonic powers. There was no aesthetic charge to evil.
Instead, the banality hypothesis allowed evil to be situated in totally secular
terms, as a function of everyday tasks done by individuals who refuse to make, or
prove themselves to be incapable of making, moral decisions. Years later, Arendt
summed up her view thus: “it was not stupidity but thoughtlessness” that was at
the core of the evil committed by Eichmann.80
Such thoughtlessness opened up a space for the solution to the problem of
the banality of evil. As a moralist, Arendt believed that individuals must make
choices, and good choices can arise only out of a strenuous process of thought.
Thoughtlessness, as Arendt argued, was helpful to the successful functioning of
the Nazi bureaucracy. “Clichés, stock phrases, adherence to standardized codes of
expression and conduct” undermine thought and stymie moral judgments; they
undermine our openness to “reality.”81 Perhaps. Certainly no one would want to
argue against serious thought or confrontation with moral issues. But, as David
Cesarani indicates, Eichmann did think, did choose to make himself into what he
became, a “genocidaire.”82 If so, then such thinking mocks Arendt’s pretensions
to the humane implications of thought and moral considerations. Eichmann,
no less than Martin Heidegger (her philosophical mentor and one-time lover),
then, was hardly thoughtless; he was a thinker that chose evil, after weighing the
evidence and considering the implications of his actions. But this was a troubling
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conclusion, because it meant that those who did think and could ponder morality
still chose evil. If so, then her plea for greater depth of thought might seem beside
the point; that, she could not countenance. Moreover, there was no reason for
Arendt to think in either/or terms concerning her two hypotheses of evil. Radical
evil could coexist with banality, the one capturing a certain monumentality of
evil, in intent and scale, and the other a mode of acting so as not to confront the
reality of radical evil.

∗∗∗
How to deal with evil became another issue that Arendt dealt with in
controversial fashion. In part, the trial of Eichmann was intended as a show, to
point up how Israel now stood ready to defend Jews everywhere and every time.
Accounts of resistance to the Holocaust on the part of Jews became sacred texts,
anticipations of the state of Israel’s stance as defender of the Jews. The problem
with this theme of heroic Jewish resistance, for Arendt, was that it erased a deeper
historical reality, one that survivors were either not allowed to, or preferred not to,
confront—the role of Jewish councils, the Judenräte, in cooperating with the Nazi
ofﬁcials. Although she devoted less than ten pages to this issue, it would prove
to be some the most controversial parts of her account. She wanted to balance
the ledger, to demonstrate the “true dimensions” of the “totality of the moral
collapse” (111). Borrowing heavily from Hilberg’s recent account, and picking
up on themes that Bruno Bettelheim was pursuing at the same time, Arendt
found that Jewish leaders had aided the Nazis.83 She did not peer deeply into
the perplexing situation and the possibility of mixed motives, of what Primo
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Levi had famously described as the “Gray Zone.”84 Instead, Arendt claimed that
´ z, who renamed himself Chaim
these leaders, such as Chaim Rumkowski in Łod´
I and issued stamps with his portrait and currency with his signature, acted as
they had because they enjoyed their power, however illusory it ended up being.
But was this not precisely the type of concern for motives and intentions that
she had condemned in Eichmann? As to the argument that these leaders had
acted morally within the murky limits of possibility and understanding, Arendt
was disdainful. Dr Kastner in Hungary, Arendt related, became one of many
“instruments of murder” for the Nazis; the truth was “gruesome.” Kastner had
saved 1,684 people while helping the Nazis collect 476,000 others for their deaths.
From Arendt’s perspective this was morally heinous, and she maintained that
other choices did exist. The Jewish leaders should not have cooperated; “there
would have been chaos and plenty of misery but the total number of victims
would hardly have been” as large (111).

∗∗∗
Arendt’s work as a moral historian, then, however problematic in its
particulars, combined judgment with explanation. Sometimes her judgments
were harsh, sometimes they were simply mistaken. Too often she attempted to ﬁt
her historical research into her preconceived notions.85 But in all of her work she
highlighted moral issues, focused on individual agents and their responsibility for
their actions, and upon the context(s) in which they make them. She also accepted
the crunching reality of evil that still festered in the ashes of the Holocaust. She
attempted to explain the forces that had brought evil forth into the world and
how it had sought both the physical and historical extermination of a people.
In tandem with the concerns of her fellow New York intellectuals about mass
culture and wary of metaphysical and demonic explanations of evil, Arendt
shifted her perspective on evil. She came to emphasize evil as largely a function of
thoughtlessness, something that was at times banal in intent but horrendous in
its consequences. At all times, Arendt upheld the responsibility of the individual
to resist incorporation into the mass, to remain attuned to personal choice and
responsibility in the formulation and pursuit of moral choices. This marked her
work and inﬂuence as a moral historian.
Hardly surprising, then, that Arendt would appeal to some in a generation
coming of age in the 1960s, seething with antagonism against a world that often
seemed imprisoned by the illogic of mutually assured atomic destruction and by
84

85

P. Levi, The Drowned and the Saved, trans. Raymond Rosenthal (New York: Vintage
International, 1989), 36–69.
Cesarani, Becoming Eichmann, 344.

hannah arendt and moral history

the war in Vietnam. Psychologist Stanley Milgram’s experiments into how normal
people would, upon orders given by authority ﬁgures, inﬂict punishment on
innocent subjects, owed much to Arendt’s considerations of totalitarianism and
evil. Many in the New Left in the 1960s embraced Arendt’s morally infused analysis
and her conception of the banality of evil, based on a thoughtless following of
orders.86
Arendt deserves our attention as a helpful precursor to the moral turn afoot
today in historical studies.87 Such a moral turn means that historians increasingly
desire to employ concepts from moral philosophy to interrogate historical events
while moral philosophers turn to history to ﬁnd ways of thickening their moral
concepts.88 This can be seen, for example, in Harry S. Stout’s recent work, where
he employs the concept of “just war” to examine the Civil War. While he ﬁnds
the war justiﬁed on the part of the North (to maintain the Union and later to
end slavery), he argues that the means employed by both sides, but especially
by the North, in total war to have been immoral. And he seeks to understand
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the underlying ideology of messianic mission, as preached from pulpits in both
North and South as a type of baptism in oratory that preﬁgured the bloody
reality of the war. Yet in applying moral concepts, either Arendt’s on banality or
those of just war, historians should also look to how concepts must be revised,
or at least reconsidered, in the face of historical complexities. Thus, while justwar theory is no doubt correct in noting, in Kantian terms, that means should
never be subsumed to ends, might certain historical situations “override” or
question moral admonitions? Might situations of “supreme emergency,” to use
philosopher Michael Walzer’s term, such as occurred after the crushing Union
defeat at the Second Battle of Bull Run in 1862, warrant extreme and immoral
means in order to save a just cause?89 Historians, and moral philosophers, in
any event, are best served when afﬁxing blame or judgment is less central than a
full and complex understanding about means and ends within speciﬁc historical
contexts. This desire for complexity is at the heart of the “moral mind,” which
Eichmann noticeably lacked and which Arendt celebrated. But as Arendt and
others from her milieu, such as Lionel Trilling, realized, such a mind is the
starting point for understanding and evaluation, as well as for sophisticated
judgment attuned to contradiction and ambiguity.90
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